China has been heavily criticized for its close ties with Sudan. Despite an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region, China continues to trade and support the Khartoum regime. Furthermore, China has threatened to veto any United Nations Security Council resolution that would send an international force into Sudan[1]. Those searching for an international solution to the Darfur crisis have long been frustrated by China’s insistence on the principle of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Recently, however, Chinese policy has started to shift in a favorable direction. The manner with which China has dealt with this situation provides a better understanding of how China deals with asymmetric relationships in Africa.
The Darfur conflict in Sudan began in 2003[2]. Rebel groups from Darfur, a poor, disenfranchised part of Sudan, rebelled against the government after years of discontent. The militias managed to cause a great deal of destruction, which humiliated the Sudanese government. Instead of negotiating or attempting to find a political solution, the Sudanese government responded forcefully. The Khartoum regime mobilized militias to carry out a brutal anti-insurgency campaign against the non-Arab people in Darfur. The government-back militia groups in Sudan have killed over a hundred thousand people, displaced over a million others, and have completely destroyed villages. In 2004, US Secretary of State stated that the killings in Darfur constitute genocide.[3] Two years after that, Kofi Annan stated that it was the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.[4]
China has a close relationship with Sudan, and was initially not willing to support any action that interfered in its domestic affairs. For China, Sudan is a vital trade partner because of its oil reserves. China is now the world’s second largest importer of crude oil. Experts predict that by 2020, 60% of its oil will be imported.[5] It is estimated that China has invested around $4 billion in Sudan, which in turn exports around 40% of its oil to China.[6] The need for economic resources is real, and China cannot afford to lose its partnership with Sudan.
In addition to the revenue that Khartoum generates from oil sales, they are also obtaining weapons from China. Sudan has purchased fighter aircraft, gunship, transportation helicopters, and military trucks that were used in attacks in Darfur.[7] Human Rights First, an organization based in the United States, recently linked Chinese arms sales with the violence in Darfur[8]. These reports focused on increased small arms sales, which occurred after the United Nations arms embargo went into effect. Since then, China has been virtually the only arms supplier to Sudan, completely ignoring the sanction.[9] The Chinese government has expressed its concerns over the validity of the story, and noted that the accusations were supported by a misinterpretation of data.
Why China is Slow to Respond
China has opposed all UN resolutions that have not been accepted by Khartoum, including those that propose economic sanctions. Various observers have argued that the main reason for Beijing’s opposition has to do with the fact that China is trying to protect its oil interests in Sudan. This explanation, however, oversimplifies China’s policy toward Sudan. China would of course like to maintain strategic ties with Sudan, but that is not the only reason for opposing international action in Sudan. In order to fully assess the implications of China’s changing policy toward Sudan, it is important to have a more complete understanding of why China has been unwilling to submit to the demands of the international community.
While protecting oil interests is vital, there are other philosophical and practical concerns for China, which are rarely mentioned or considered by critics. China and the West have fundamental disagreements over the roots and type of the conflict in Darfur. The Chinese envoy in Sudan, Liu Guijin, noted that the conflict in Darfur is more about development than anything else.[10] Liu argued that the key to ending the crisis is more humanitarian assistance that can be used to help the region develop. Under this assumption, economic sanctions and divestment would be counter-productive, and it is easy to see the logic of China’s efforts to veto resolutions seeking to sanction Sudan.
Politically, a radical break from policy could have profound implications for China’s partners around the world. Adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence cultivates trust in bilateral relationships. If China were to violate those principles in Sudan, it is possible that other smaller countries would be concerned about their own relationship with China. The Sino-Sudanese relationship has been strong for several decades, and a sudden break could increase over-attention from both Sudan and others. If China ignores the principles of non-interference and sovereignty in the face of international opposition, how could they be sure it would not happen to them? China’s near crisis situation with Zambia in 2006 provides a good example of what might happen if Beijing decided to ignore those basic principles.
The Sino-Zambian case helps illustrate the importance of upholding the Five Principles, and the challenge of managing asymmetric relations. After decades of strong ties, Sino-Zambian relations began to break down in 2004 when workers started complaining about low wages, poor working conditions, and rights violations in Chinese factories. In 2005, protests escalated after a Chinese mine exploded and killed 46 Zambian workers. The following year, the presidential candidate for the opposition party ran on an anti-China platform, in which he promised to recognize Taiwan over China. Upon learning this, the Chinese ambassador was furious and threatened to withdraw investment if he were to be elected.[11]
The ambassador’s threat was a clear violation of the principle of non-interference. Both the ruling party and other African governments with ties to China were concerned with his statements.[12] In the end, the opposition candidate was not elected, and members of the ruling party issued numerous public apologies to Beijing. On the Chinese side, officials were committed to their involvement in Zambia and decided to implement health care programs and build infrastructure, rather than continuing to hold an aggressive position. However, China’s presence continues to fuel political debate, and if the opposition gains more political clout, Zambia may not be so deferential to China.
As this section has shown, violating one or more of the Five Principles has the potential to produce misperceptions about China’s intentions. These can, in turn, create even more problems and challenges for China and smaller African nations. In the context of this complex situation, it is impressive that China has been able to make changes.
China’s Evolving Policy Toward Sudan
China has taken a more active role in the Darfur peace process by publicly giving aid, and by privately encouraging Sudan to adopt Security Council resolutions. While not fully meeting the demands and requests of the international community, China has been significantly more helpful than before. Instead of sanctions and isolation, China has engaged Sudan through high-level visits to work out political solutions to the Darfur conflict.
The Chinese government has provided around $11 million in humanitarian assistance, and over $1 million assist African Union forces in the Darfur region.[13] In addition, China has set up high-level visits with the Sudanese to negotiate political solutions to the conflict. In 2006, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations was credited for convincing the Sudanese to sign the Annan Plan in 2006.[14] When Khartoum failed to uphold the treaty, China removed them from the list of countries with preferred trade status.[15] These are just a few of the ways that China has been more active.
When looking at China’s increased participation in the Darfur peace process, many have speculated as to why they are becoming involved. The most common assumption people make is that China’s changing policy is the result of international pressure. While China’s image has certainly suffered as a result of the conflict, it would be inadequate to attribute this change solely to international pressure. There are, instead, a variety of factors that could have contributed to China’s policy change.
There are many reasons to explain China’s changing behavior. First, the escalation of international criticism, especially before the Olympics, has hurt China’s image in the international community. As this paper has mentioned, this is a factor, but not the only one. Second, instability in the region threatens Chinese strategic interests. The Darfur conflict has recently spilled over into Chad, which recently signed an oil agreement with China. China has noted that the conflict has a potential to impact most of the region, which is not in China’s interest.[16] Third, Beijing realized that the international community was going to attempt to solve the conflict, regardless of what China does.[17] Fourth, refusal to support the replacement of AU troops with UN troops might harm China’s relationship with other African nations.[18]
Policy Change and Asymmetric Management
How China has been able to manage relations with Sudan during this time is impressive. Asymmetry theory helps explain how China has been able to maintain a balance between Sudan and the international community.
There are a number of steps China has taken to neutralize conflict areas. First, China has been insistent on formulating the issue so that it aligns with the interests of all. For example, during a meeting between Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Sate John Negroponte, Dai convinced the state department to characterize the situation in Darfur as a ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than ’genocide’.[19] When working with Africa, China’s views on Darfur have been shaped by discussions with African states, rather than by the West or their own assumptions. By working with other African countries, China prevents the issue from becoming a Sino-Sudanese issue, thereby reducing tension between the two.
Diplomatic ritual is a contributing factor to China’s success. Beijing recently appointed Ambassador Liu Guijin as ambassador to Africa, whose top priority is Darfur. He has worked with many African nations, including Sudan, toward possible solutions in Darfur. In all of his statements, his rhetoric is always inclusive and reassuring to Khartoum. In addition, China has done a good job respecting Sudan’s autonomy by not supporting any resolution that violates its autonomy. Not only do they oppose unfavorable resolutions, they help craft new ones. For example, China has helped Sudan negotiate resolutions with the United Nations to ensure that any peacekeeping forces be African. Khartoum fears a Western presence in the region, and China has tried to meet Sudan’s requests. While they may privately pressure Khartoum into adopting certain resolutions, publicly they remain committed to upholding the principles of non-interference.[20]
So far China has been able to prevent a crisis, but there are still some concerns. Although China has not been very forceful, their attempts to encourage Sudan to adopt and carry out various resolutions have not worked. If Sudan continues to ignore China, it will increase the chance of systemic misperception between the two nations. Either China could perceive Sudan as not being deferential, or Sudan could perceive China has not respectful of autonomy.
China’s skillful management of its relationship with Sudan has thus far been successful. By taking an active role in the Darfur peace process, Beijing has shown the international community that it is willing to find a solution. At the same time, however, China has preserved its relationship with Khartoum. High-level exchanges have helped create a sense of mutual understanding, which in turn has signified to Khartoum that its sovereignty is respected.
[1] It is important to note that China never opposed deployment of UN troops to Darfur, but it did refuse peace operations that would enter Sudan without the consent of the national government. See Holslag, J. (2008). China’s Diplomatic Manoeuvering on the Question of Darfur. Journal of Contemporary China, 17(54), 71-84.
[2] Prunier, G. (2006). Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, Revised and Updated Edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. And Flint, J., & Waal, A. (2008). Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (African Arguments). London: Zed Books.
[3] BBC NEWS | Africa | Powell declares genocide in Sudan. (2004, September 9).
[4] Annan Calls Darfur ‘World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis’ – RADIO FREE EUROPE / RADIO LIBERTY. (2006, May 9).
[5] See Andrews-Speed, A. (2002). The Strategic Implications of China’s Energy Needs (Adelphi Papers, 346). New York: Routledge.
[6] Taylor (2007), p. 18
[7] See Curtis and Hickson in Wild, L., & Mepham, D. (2006). The New Sinosphere. Montreal: Institute For Public Policy Research, p. 38.
[8] Eckert, P. (2008, March 14). U.S. report links China arms sales to Darfur carnage – International Herald Tribune. Another report of the study can be found here: Human Rights First: China’s small arms sales to Sudan increased as Darfur violence escalated – International Herald Tribune. (2008, March 13).
[9] The Human Rights First report noted that China was supplying around 90%. Other studies have shown that Russia is also supplying weapons, see BBC NEWS | Africa | China, Russia deny weapons breach. (2007, May 8).
[10] 刘贵今：达尔富尔问题实质是“发展的问题. (2007, May 29). 新华日报.
[11] See Alden, C. (2007). China in Africa: Partner, Competitor or Hegemon? (African Arguments). London: Zed Books, p. 72-6.
[12] Ibid. p. 75
[13] He, W. (2007). The Balancing Act of China’s Africa Policy. China Security, 3(3), 23-40.
[14] Under the Annan Plan, UN troops would reinforce the African Union troops stationed in Darfur. This was an important step in the peace process because the African Union forces were ill-equipped to maintain peace.
[15] Gill, B., Huang, C., & Morrison, J. (2007). Assessing China’s Growing Influence in Africa. China Security, 3(3), 3-21.
[16] Holslag, p. 75
[17] Downs, E. (2007). The Fact and Fiction of Sino-Africa Energy Relations. China Security, 3(3), p. 60.
[18] Holslag, p. 75
[19] Gill, et al, p. 15
[20] Ibid, p. 13
